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Foreword: Beyond Blakely and Booker:
Pondering Modern Sentencing Process
Douglas A. Berman

Abstract

The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Blakely v. Washington and its federal
follow-up United States v. Booker are formally about the meaning and reach of the
Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial. But these decisions implicate and reflect,
both expressly and implicitly, a much broader array of constitutional provisions
and principles, in particular, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and the notice provision of the Sixth Amendment. And the future
structure and operation of modern sentencing systems may greatly depend on how
courts and others approach the due process provisions and principles which lurk in
the unexplored shadows of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely and Booker.
In this foreword, I explain why an important enduring question which emerges
from the Supreme Court’s recent sentencing jurisprudence concerns whether, when
and how procedural issues other than the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right will
be addressed after Blakely and Booker. In Part I, I provide a brief account of
modern sentencing reform and its neglect of an array of procedural issues. Part II
focuses upon the Supreme Court’s past and present jurisprudential struggles with
procedural rights at sentencing. Part III sketches considerations for courts and
other key sentencing actors and institutions as they explore what process is due in
modern sentencing systems.
Part III concludes by suggesting that the pitched battle over the rights and results
in Blakely and Booker reflect competing visions of what procedural concepts and
norms will take center-stage as the Supreme Court considers the applicable constitutional rules for modern sentencing decision-making. Justice Stevens leads a
faction of the Court concerned about safeguarding procedural rights for defendants at sentencing, while Justice Breyer leads a faction of the Court concerned

about ensuring that applicable procedures at sentencing serve the goal of sentencing uniformity. But, with Justice Ginsburg having allied herself with both of
these competing factions in Booker, the schizophrenic Booker ruling further obscures which principles should guide lower courts in considering the broad range
of procedural issues beyond jury trial rights that follow in the wake of Blakely and
Booker.
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: BEYOND BLAKELY AND
BOOKER: PONDERING MODERN
SENTENCING PROCESS
DOUGLAS A. BERMAN*
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Blakely v. Washington1 and
its federal follow-up United States v. Booker2 are formally about the
meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial. But these
decisions implicate and reflect, both expressly and implicitly, a much
broader array of constitutional provisions and principles, in particular, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the notice
provision of the Sixth Amendment. And the future structure and operation
of modern sentencing systems may greatly depend on how courts and others
approach the due process provisions and principles which lurk in the
unexplored shadows of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely and
Booker.
In this foreword, I explain why an important enduring question which
emerges from the Supreme Court’s recent sentencing jurisprudence
concerns whether, when and how procedural issues other than the Sixth
Amendment’s jury trial right will be addressed after Blakely and Booker. In
Part I, I provide a brief account of modern sentencing reform and its neglect
of an array of procedural issues. Part II focuses upon the Supreme Court’s
past and present jurisprudential struggles with procedural rights at
sentencing. Part III concludes by briefly sketching some considerations for
courts and other key sentencing actors and institutions as they explore what
process is due in modern sentencing systems.

*
1
2

Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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I. THE SENTENCING REVOLUTION: MODERN SENTENCING REFORMS AND
THE NEGLECT OF SENTENCING PROCEDURES
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM MOVEMENT

Beginning in the late nineteenth century and throughout the first threequarters of the twentieth century, a highly discretionary, rehabilitative
“medical” model was the dominant approach to sentencing.3 Trial judges in
both federal and state systems had nearly unfettered discretion to impose on
defendants any sentence from within the broad statutory ranges provided
for criminal offenses.4 Such broad judicial discretion in the ascription of
sentencing terms—complemented by parole officials exercising similar
discretion concerning prison release dates—was viewed as necessary to
ensure that sentences could be tailored to the rehabilitative prospects and
progress of each offender.5 The rehabilitative ideal was often conceived
and discussed in medical terms—with offenders described as “sick” and
punishments aspiring to “cure the patient”6—and sentencing judges and
parole officials were thought to have unique insights and expertise in
deciding what sorts and lengths of punishments were necessary to best
serve each criminal offender’s rehabilitative potential.7 Procedurally,

3

See, e.g., SANDRA SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES:
HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT 5-6 (1985); J. L. MILLER ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM 1-6
(1981). See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 3-7
(1981) (discussing the “dominance” and “almost unchallenged sway of the rehabilitative
ideal” through the late 1960s).
4
See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps
Backward, 78 JUDICATURE 169, 169-70 (1995) (“Subject only to statutory maximums and the
occasional minimums, judges had the authority to sentence convicted defendants either to
probation (and under what conditions) or to prison (and for what maximum term).”); see also
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (discussing the “wide discretion” given
to federal judges in ascribing sentences during this time).
5
See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission’s Functions, in THE
SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 3 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987)
(noting that “wide discretion was ostensibly justified for rehabilitative ends: to enable judges
and parole officials familiar with the case to choose a disposition tailored to the offender’s
need for treatment”). See generally KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9-22 (1998) (reviewing the early history
of federal sentencing and the link between the rehabilitative ideal and discretionary
sentencing practices).
6
See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 163 (1967) (describing offenders as “patients”); see
also Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1016-18 (1991)
(discussing the medical model and its “powerful sway within the criminal justice system”).
7
See Nancy Gertner, What Has Harris Wrought, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 83, 83 (2002)
(describing vision of “judge as the sentencing expert” in a rehabilitative sentencing system);
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sentencing was really a form of administrative decision-making in which
sentencing judges and parole officials, aided by complete information about
offenders and unfettered discretionary authority, were expected to craft
individualized sentences “almost like a doctor or social worker exercising
clinical judgment.”8
But through the 1960s and 1970s, criminal justice researchers and
scholars were growing concerned about the unpredictable and disparate
sentences highly discretionary sentencing systems could produce. Evidence
suggested that broad judicial sentencing discretion was resulting in
substan tial and undue differences in the lengths and types of sentences
meted out to similar defendants,9 and some studies found that personal
factors such as an offender’s race, gender and socioeconomic status were
impacting sentencing outcomes and accounted for certain disparities.10
Troubled by the disparity and discrimination resulting from highly
discretionary sentencing practices—and fueled by concerns over increasing
crime rates and powerful criticisms of the entire rehabilitative model of
punishment and corrections11—many criminal justice experts proposed
reforms in order to bring greater consistency and certainty to the sentencing
enterprise.12
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 19-21 (describing view of parole officials as experts in
assessing an offender’s rehabilitation).
8
United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D. Mass. 2004).
9
See, e.g., Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 272-74
(1977) (reviewing studies and asserting that “the data on unjust sentencing disparity have
indeed become quite overwhelming”); Ilene Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The
New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895-97 (1990)
(detailing studies showing widespread, unwarranted sentencing disparities).
10
See Nagel, supra note 9, at 895-97 & nn.73-84 (discussing empirical studies
documenting sentencing impact of race, gender, socioeconomic class and other status
characteristics); William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold
Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 359-62
(1991) (reviewing studies revealing the impact of racial discrimination at sentencing).
11
See ALLEN, supra note 3, at 7-20 (discussing “wide and precipitious decline of penal
rehabilitationism” as a foundational theory for the criminal justice system). See generally
AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971); ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG,
PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS (1976); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
12
See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSIONERS’ MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT (1979) [hereinafter MODEL
SENTENCING ACT]; PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING
SYSTEM (1977); VON HIRSCH, supra note 11; DAVID FOGEL, “. . . WE ARE THE LIVING
PROOF . . .”: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975); see also NORVAL MORRIS, THE
FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974) (stressing need to reform sentencing practices as a
prerequisite to making imprisonment a rational and humane means of punishment). See
generally ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM
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While concerns about sentencing disparities and discrimination were a
catalyst for modern sentencing reforms, the fundamental problem with
traditional discretionary sentencing systems was the absence of any defined
sentencing law. This was Judge Marvin Frankel’s central insight and
criticism in commentaries that helped fuel the modern sentencing reform
movement over thirty years ago.13 Sentencing disparity, in Frankel’s
words, was a symptom of the greater disease of “lawlessness in
sentencing.” Frankel recognized that, at a time of declining faith in the
rehabilitative model, “legislatures [had] not done the most rudimentary job
of enacting meaningful sentencing ‘laws’,”14 and thus sentencing judges
(and parole officials) exercised broad discretion and wielded enormous
sentencing power “effectively subject to no law at all.”15
Frankel was concerned about not only the absence of substantive
sentencing law, but also the questionable procedures through which
sentencing decisions were rendered. In a chapter of his book Criminal
Sentences: Law Without Order entitled “The Dubious Process,” Frankel
noted the absence of significant procedural safeguards in discretionary
sentencing decision-making,16 and he suggested that the lack of procedural
regularity contributed to “a wild array of sentencing judgments without any
semblance of consistency.”17 Frankel expressed particular concern about
how information considered at sentencing was assembled and examined.
He noted that “presentence investigation represents a sudden and total
departure from [a court’s usual] fact-gathering procedures,” because it
provides information to judges that is not “exposed to adversary scrutiny, to
rechecking at sources, to cross-examination.”18 Frankel highlighted that,
because presentence investigations relied upon ex parte reports from
prosecutors and findings were typically not disclosed to defendants, courts
at sentencing were often making “grave decisions of law upon untested
hearsay and rumor.”19 Frankel lamented that, because the contents of
126-42 (1983) (describing forces behind early reforms); MILLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 6-13
(noting that sentencing reform was “stimulated by perceptions of increasing crime,
unwarranted differences in sentences, and ineffective rehabilitation programs”).
13
See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972)
[hereinafter Frankel, Lawlessness]; see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972) [hereinafter FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES].
14
FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 13, at 7.
15
Id. at 3-11; see also Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative
Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043, 2044 (1992) (calling prior sentencing “thoroughly
lawless”).
16
See FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 13, at 26-38.
17
Id. at 7-8.
18
Id. at 27-32.
19
Id. at 28-32.
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presentence reports originated “from the prosecutor or the prosecutor’s
files” and were “passed on with little or no independent scrutiny,”
sentencing decision-making involved a “process of reaching [a sentencing
judgment that was] not reflective or orderly.”20
Since “lawlessness” was the fundamental problem in discretionary
sentencing systems, Frankel urged the development of a “code of penal
law” which would “prescribe guidelines for the application and assessment”
of “the numerous factors affecting the length or severity of sentences.”21
Moreover, Frankel suggested creating a new institution in the form of a
special agency—a “Commission on Sentencing”—to help address
lawlessness in sentencing.22 Embracing the spirit and substance of
Frankel’s ideas, many experts and scholars soon came to propose or
endorse some form of sentencing guidelines to govern sentencing
determinations,23 and urged the creation of specialized sentencing
commissions to develop the sentencing law called for by the “guidelines
model.”24
These calls for reform were soon heeded. Through the late 1970s and
early 1980s, a few states adopted a form of sentencing guidelines when
legislatures passed determinate sentencing statutes which abolished parole
and created presumptive sentencing ranges for various classes of offenses.25
Minnesota became the first state to turn Frankel’s ideas into a full-fledged
reality in 1978, when the Minnesota legislature established the Minnesota
20

Id. at 34, 38.
Id. at 103-18; see also Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, A Conversation About
Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 656 (1993) (statement
by Marvin Frankel) (explaining that the “overriding objective” of sentencing guideline
reforms “was to subject sentencing to law”).
22
FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 13, at 118-24; see also Frankel,
Lawlessness, supra note 13, at 50-54.
23
See sources cited supra note 12; see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3
(1988) (explaining that “[a]t the federal level before 1985, scholars and practitioners in the
criminal justice community almost unanimously favored the concept of guidelines”); Charles
J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1944 (1988) (noting that the “general consensus . . . among judges,
lawyers, criminal justice experts, and scholars, [was] that sentencing guidelines were
needed”).
24
See Michael H. Tonry, The Sentencing Commission in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 315, 324 (1979); MODEL SENTENCING ACT, supra note 12, at § 3-110 & cmt.;
O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 12, at 73-74.
25
See MICHAEL H. TONRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING REFORM IMPACTS 77-85
(1987); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
STRUCTURED SENTENCING 14-17 (1996) (discussing move to determinate sentencing in
various jurisdictions) [hereinafter STRUCTURED SENTENCING].
21
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Sentencing Guidelines Commission to develop comprehensive sentencing
guidelines.26 Washington and Pennsylvania followed suit by creating their
own distinctive forms of sentencing commissions and sentencing guidelines
in 1981 and 1982, respectively.27 During the early 1980s, various systems
of sentencing guidelines also emerged in Utah, Maryland, Florida and
Michigan, although permanent sentencing commissions were not
established in these states until years later.28 The federal government soon
thereafter joined this sentencing reform movement through the passage of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the U.S. Sentencing
Commission to develop guidelines for federal sentencing.29 Throughout the
next two decades, many more states adopted some form of structured
sentencing either though mandatory sentencing statutes or comprehensive
guideline schemes.30
Though there is considerable variation in the form and impact of
structured sentencing reforms, the overall transformation of the sentencing
enterprise throughout the United States over the past three decades has been
remarkable.31 The highly-discretionary indeterminate sentencing systems
26
See 1978 Minn. Laws 723 (enabling statute). The initial version of the Minnesota
sentencing guidelines was contained in MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION,
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (1980). See generally DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Daniel J.
Freed ed., 1988) (discussing the operations of Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines
Commission, the state’s enactment, and early experiences with sentencing guidelines).
27
See 204 PA. CODE § 303 (1982) (codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721 (West
1982)); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.040 (West 1988). See generally A Summary of the
Minnesota, Washington, and Pennsylvania Guidelines, in THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND
ITS GUIDELINES app. at 177-88 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987) (reviewing major
components of guidelines developed in Minnesota, Washington and Pennsylvania).
28
See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the
Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 69, 70 (2000)
(providing table summarizing development of sentencing guidelines systems).
29
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 58, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017-26
(1984).
30
See STRUCTURED SENTENCING, supra note 25, at 19-29 & tbls. 3-3 to 3-5 (detailing
sentencing structures throughout United States as of February 1994); Frase, supra note 28, at
69-72 (detailing and discussing the nearly two dozen jurisdictions that now have, or are
actively considering, a sentencing system incorporating sentencing guidelines devised by a
sentencing commission); DALE PARENT ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MANDATORY
SENTENCING 1 (1997) (noting that “[b]y 1994, all 50 States had enacted one or more
mandatory sentencing laws, and Congress had enacted numerous mandatory sentencing laws
for Federal offenders”).
31
See Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Reform “Reform” Through Sentencing Information
Systems, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 121 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) (“Sentencing has
undergone more reform over the past several decades than any other area of criminal justice,
and perhaps as much reform as any area of the law.”); see also Tonry, supra note 4, at 169
(“If a time machine were to transport a group of state and federal judges from 1970 to a
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that had been dominant for nearly a century have been replaced by an array
of sentencing structures that govern and control sentencing decisionmaking. Put simply, in response to Judge Frankel’s call for reforms,
jurisdictions brought law—often lots and lots of law—to sentencing.
B. A NEGLECT OF SENTENCING PROCEDURES

The arrival of modern sentencing laws did not come with a new
modern set of sentencing procedures. While legislatures and sentencing
commissions were revolutionizing the substance of sentencing in an effort
to ensure more consistent and rational sentencing outcomes, serious
consideration of the procedures of sentencing was essentially overlooked.
Legisla tures and sentencing commissions have committed much time and
energy to enacting laws and developing guidelines to govern substantive
sentencing decisions, but they have given scant attention to regulating the
processes through which judges obtain and assess the information that
serves as the basis for reaching these decisions. Despite creating a
significant body of substantive sentencing law, legislatures and
commissions in most jurisdictions have left largely unaddressed
fundamental issues such as notice to parties, burdens of proof, appropriate
fact-finders, evidentiary rules, and hearing processes—even though these
procedural matters play a central role in the actual application of general
sentencing rules to specific cases.32
Though the particulars of this story could be recounted in various
jurisdictions, the experience and struggles of the federal sentencing system
are the most conspicuous and well-documented. The Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984,33 though an elaborate piece of legislation, makes only brief
mention of sentencing procedures.34 The initial Federal Sentencing
Guid
e lines promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission—which
national conference on sentencing in 1995, most would be astonished by a quarter century’s
changes.”).
32
See Frank O. Bowman, III, Completing the Sentencing Revolution: Reconsidering
Sentencing Procedures in the Guidelines Era, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 187, 187 (2000)
(noting that sentencing reformers largely forgot procedural issues in the development of new
sentencing systems); see also Douglas A. Berman, Appreciating Apprendi: Developing
Sentencing Procedures in the Shadow of the Constitution, 67 CRIM. L. BULL. 627, 636-40
(2001) (discussing sentencing reformers’ emphasis on substance over procedure).
33
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
34
See THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE §
6A1.3 (1998) (noting that “[i]n the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress did not provide for
specific procedures at sentencing”); see also Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the
Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of
Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 314 (1992) (stating that “[t]he Sentencing Reform Act
does not mention procedure”).
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comprised more than two hundred pages and contained over one hundred
multi-section guidelines—were remarkably detailed and sought to
comprehensively prescribe the weight to be given at sentencing to a host of
offense and offender factors.35
Yet, even though the Sentencing
Commission itself recognized that “[r]eliable fact-finding is essential to
procedural due process and to the accuracy and uniformity of sentencing,”36
less than three pages of the initial Guidelines expressly addressed the
sentencing process.37
Through a few terse policy statements in these pages, the Sentencing
Commission did call for the preparation and timely disclosure of presentence reports,38 and urged judges to give parties “an adequate
opportunity” to dispute any factor important to the sentencing determination
and rely only on information with “sufficient indicia of reliability to support
its probable accuracy.”39 But, in sharp contrast to the other portions of the
Guid
elines, which intricately delineated how various substantive matters
should be incorporated into the Guidelines calculus, the Commission did
not go beyond these vague exhortations to provide any detailed guidance to
judges on issues like notice to parties, appropriate burdens of proof and
fact-finders, or applicable evidentiary rules and hearing procedures. As
Professor Kate Stith and Judge Jose Cabranes aptly recognized, “[b]eyond
making the important but obvious point that fact-finding at sentencing
should be reliable, the Commission’s Policy Statements prescribe few
procedural safeguards to ensure that this objective is achieved.”40 And lest
the U.S. Sentencing Commission be unduly singled out, it should be noted
that the vague exhortations concerning sentencing procedures in the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines generally surpass the amount of attention given to
procedural matters in many state sentencing reforms.41
35
See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY
STATEMENTS (1987) [hereinafter 1987 U.S.S.G.].
36
Id. Ch. 6, Pt. A, at 6.1 (Introductory Commentary).
37
See id. Ch. 6, Pt. A, at 6.A.1-6.A.3.
38
See id. §§ 6A1.1, 6A1.2.
39
Id. § 6A1.3.
40
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 154; accord Herman, supra note 34, at 315
(noting that “the Commission contented itself with simply commenting that more formal
proceedings should be required at sentencing under the guidelines and leaving it to the courts
to implement this suggestion”); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FED. RULES OF EVIDENCE
COMM., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS, 177 F.R.D. 513, 514
(1998) (noting that “neither Congress (in the SRA) nor the Commission (in the Guidelines)
addressed in any detail critical evidentiary issues such as burdens of proof, admissibility of
evidence, confrontation rights and hearing procedures”).
41
See, e.g., People v. Williams, 599 N.E.2d 913, 921 (Ill. 1992) (noting absence of
language in Illinois sentencing statute specifying burden of proof); Commonwealth v. Hartz,
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Real limitations of time and perceived limitations of authority may in
part explain the failure of federal and state sentencing reformers to give
serious attention to matters of procedure. Given the challenge of
developing legal rules for the previously law-free arena of sentencing,42 and
with disparities in substantive sentencing outcomes a principal concern,
legislatures and sentencing commissions understandably focused their
attention first and foremost on reforming (or, in most cases, creating)
substantive sentencing laws. Moreover, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
suggested in various ways that it believed other institutions—in particular,
the judiciary—were in the best position and possessed ultimate authority to
prescribe procedural rules for sentencing.43 Nevertheless, whatever reasons
or excuses might be given for the failure to attend to sentencing procedures,
the fact remained that the applicable procedures used at sentencing—a key
concern expressed by Judge Frankel in his impassioned call for sentencing
reforms—were not seriously addressed or carefully considered in most
modern sentencing laws and guidelines.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT’S PROCEDURAL SENTENCING JURISPRUDENCE

A. THE OLD WORLD ORDER

It is possible that modern sentencing reforms neglected procedural
considerations because the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional sentencing
jurisprudence readily permitted such neglect. Through a series of cases
extending over fifty years and through the start of the sentencing reform
era, the Supreme Court expressed little or no interest in interpreting various
constitutional provisions to regulate the procedures which governed (non532 A.2d 1139, 1157-58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (noting failure of Pennsylvania guidelines to
provide specified burden of proof for sentencing enhancement).
42
See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 64-69 (1996) (detailing the host of
significant substantive issues and policy choices that face sentencing commissions when
drafting guidelines); see also Breyer, supra note 23, at 2-31 (stressing the unique challenges
facing the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the range of substantive compromises reached
in developing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
43
See 1987 U.S.S.G., supra note 35, at § 6A1.3 comt. (indicating that it is up to a
sentencing court to “determine the appropriate procedure in light of the nature of the dispute,
its relevance to the sentencing determination, and applicable case law”); see also STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 5, at 154 (noting that “[i]t is arguable that the Commission is not
authorized by statute to address issues of procedural fairness under the Guidelines in any
definitive way”); Herman, supra note 34, at 314-15 (indicating that there “is some doubt as
to whether the Commission had authority to develop procedures to accompany the
guidelines” and suggesting that the Commission did not create procedural rules “because of
doubts about its own powers or optimism about the ability of the courts to develop
procedures appropriate to the new mode of sentencing”).
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capital) sentencing.
The modern line of precedents marking the Supreme Court’s hands-off
jurisprudence concerning sentencing procedures starts in 1949 with the
critical decision in Williams v. New York.44 The trial judge in Williams
sentenced to death a defendant convicted of first-degree murder, despite a
jury recommendation of life imprisonment.
The judge relied on
information of illegal and unsavory activities by the defendant which was
not presented at trial but appeared in a pre-sentence report.45 In rejecting a
claim that Williams had a right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him, the Supreme Court stressed that “[r]eformation and
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal
jurisprudence” and spoke approvingly of the “prevalent modern philosophy
of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the
crime.”46 Thus, continued the Court, the Due Process Clause should not be
read to require courts to “abandon their age-old practice of seeking
information from out-of-court sources,” because “[t]o deprive sentencing
judges of this kind of information would undermine modern penological
procedural policies” which rely upon judges having “the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.”47 In short,
according to the Williams Court, the value of “modern concepts
individualizing punishments” meant that sentencing judges should “not be
denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of
rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the
trial.”48
In other words, for the Williams Court the rehabilitative ideal not only
justified entrusting judges with enormous sentencing discretion, it also
called for sentencing judges (and presumably also parole officials) to be
freed from any procedural rules which might work to limit the sound
exercise of their discretion. Significantly, the Williams Court suggested the
rehabilitative ideal and its distinctive procedures had benefits for offenders
as well as for society. The Court stressed that “modern changes” justified
by the rehabilitative model of sentencing “have not resulted in making the
lot of offenders harder.”49 Rather, explained the Court, “a strong

44

337 U.S. 241 (1949).
See id. at 242-44. For a full discussion of the various “facts” relied upon by the
sentencing judge in Williams, see Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of RealOffense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 523, 528-30 (1993).
46
Williams, 337 U.S. at 247-48.
47
Id. at 247, 250-51.
48
Id. at 247.
49
Id. at 249.
45
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motivating force for the changes has been the belief that by careful study of
the lives and personalities of convicted offenders many could be less
severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful
citizenship.”50 And, claimed the Williams Court, “[t]his belief to a large
extent has been justified.”51
Notably, Williams was decided before the Supreme Court began
“revolutionizing” criminal procedure by expansively interpreting the
Constitution to provide criminal defendants with an array of procedural
rights.52 Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as numerous pretrial and trial rights were being established for defendants, the Supreme
Court continued to cite Williams favorably and continued to suggest that
sentencing was to be treated differently—and could be far less procedurally
regulated—than a traditional criminal trial.53 Though the Supreme Court
did ensure that defendants had a right to an attorney at sentencing hearings
and suggested defendants also had a right to discovery of evidence that
could impact a sentence,54 the Court did not formally extend other Bill of
Rights protections to the sentencing process.

50

Id.
Id.
52
The application and extension of considerable procedural rights to criminal defendants
has been called the “criminal procedure revolution” and is often associated with the work of
the Warren Court in the 1960s. See, e.g., BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, THE CRIMINAL LAW
REVOLUTION 1960-68 (1968); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A
Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1 (1995). However, as commentators have
discussed, many of the foundational decisions of this era were extended, or even first
developed, by the Burger Court through the 1970s. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the
Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies,
72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151
(1980); Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436 (1980).
53
See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-54 (1978) (discussing Williams
favorably while noting the few limits on the gathering of information for sentencing and a
judge’s broad discretion to consider a wide range of information in arriving at an appropriate
sentence); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 21-25 (1973) (reviewing Williams while
stressing “the need for flexibility and discretion in the sentencing process”); North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969) (favorably citing Williams while stressing “the freedom
of a sentencing judge” to consider a defendant’s post-conviction conduct in imposing a
sentence); see also Pearce, 395 U.S. at 742 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting that the Supreme Court has “continued to reaffirm” Williams and its “reasons
for refusing to subject the sentencing process to any [significant procedural] limitations,
which might hamstring modern penological reforms”).
54
See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (addressing the right to counsel); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (discussing the right to discovery of evidence helpful to the
defense).
51
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In 1970, the Supreme Court established, through In re Winship,55 that
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated “beyond a
reasonable doubt” as the standard of proof applicable in criminal cases, and
stressed that this heightened proof standard operated as a “bedrock
‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’”56 But, in many
cases addressing sentencing matters decided not long after Winship, the
Court did not suggest this standard of proof was to be applicable at
sentencing. Rather, the Supreme Court repeatedly stated, in a series of
cases that touched on various sentencing issues, that at sentencing “a judge
may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited
either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from
which it may come.”57
The U.S. Supreme Court next confronted a direct constitutional claim
concerning sentencing procedures in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.58 Litigated
during the early development of structured sentencing reforms, McMillan
involved a constitutional challenge to a Pennsylvania statute passed in
1982, which provided for the imposition of a five-year mandatory minimum
sentence if a judge found, by a preponderance of evidence, that an offender
visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of certain offenses.59
The defendant in McMillan argued that the Constitution required treating
the fact of firearm possession as an offense element with the traditional trial
procedures of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to a jury.
Significantly, Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act
was obviously not enacted in service to the rehabilitative ideal, and its focus
was exclusively on the offense and not the offender. As the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania explained in its consideration of McMillan’s claims, the
Pennsylvania legislature created the mandatory minimum provision “to
protect the public from armed criminals and to deter violent crime and the
illegal use of firearms generally, as well as to vindicate its interest in
punishing those who commit serious crimes with guns.”60 Thus, the
55

397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Id. at 363 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
57
Grayson, 438 U.S. at 50 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972));
see also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980) (reaffirming as a “fundamental
sentencing principle” that “a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope,
largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from
which it may come”) (quoting Grayson and Tucker).
58
477 U.S. 79 (1986).
59
See id. at 81-82 & n.1 (quoting provisions and describing operation of Pennsylvania’s
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act).
60
Commonwealth v. Wright, 494 A.2d 354, 362 (Pa. 1985).
56
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Supreme Court in McMillan was called upon to examine a new type of
punitive sentencing provision, one in which the philosophical justifications
for the administrative procedures sanctioned in Williams were no longer
present. The Court could not possibly contend or believe, as it suggested
nearly forty years earlier in Williams, that limiting defendants’ procedural
rights in this setting was about providing sentencing judges with “the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics” in
order to help defendants “be less severely punished and restored sooner to
complete freedom and useful citizenship.”61
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected McMillan’s challenges to
Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act in an opinion that
largely echoed Williams without any revised justifications. The McMillan
Court stressed that it is “normally ‘within the power of the State to regulate
procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the burden of
producing evidence and the burden of persuasion.’”62 The Court rejected
the claim that visible possession of a firearm must be treated procedurally
as an element by stating simply that Pennsylvania’s statute “gives no
impression of having been tailored to permit the visible possession finding
to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”63 The Court
even rebuffed the suggestion that the Due Process Clause at least required
that visible firearm possession be proved by clear and convincing evidence;
it cited Williams for the proposition that “sentencing courts have
traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden
of proof at all,” and suggested that it would be inappropriate to be
“constitutionalizing burdens of proof at sentencing.”64 Coining the term
“sentencing factor,” the McMillan Court simply asserted, without any

61

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949).
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)). The
McMillan Court’s discussion of these matters, and its emphasis on state authority to define
crimes and attendant procedures, drew heavily on two cases from a decade earlier, Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), in which
the Supreme Court struggled to define limits for how states could structure affirmative
defenses as applied to criminal laws. According to the McMillan Court, the upshot of these
cases was a rejection of “the claim that whenever a State links the severity of punishment to
the presence or absence of an identified fact the State must prove that fact beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 477 U.S. at 84. See generally Kate Stith, Crime and Punishment Under
the Constitution, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming) (discussing holdings and the import of
Mullaney and Patterson in the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence); Joseph L.
Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 269-72
(2001) (also discussing holdings and the import of Mullaney and Patterson in the Supreme
Court’s sentencing jurisprudence).
63
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
64
Id. at 91-92.
62
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conceptual discussion of sentencing theories or procedures, that
Pennsylvania’s decision to dictate the “precise weight” of possession of a
firearm at sentencing “has not transformed against its will a sentencing
factor into an ‘element’ of some hypothetical ‘offense.’”65 The McMillan
Court stressed repeatedly the importance of allowing state legislatures to
devise approaches to sentencing without significant constitutional
limitations; it asserted that “we should hesitate to conclude that due process
bars the State from pursuing its chosen course in the area of defining crimes
and prescribing penalties,” and emphasized the importance of a “tolerance
for a spectrum of state procedures dealing with a common problem of law
enforcement.”66
Notably, Justice Stevens delivered a passionate dissent in McMillan
which did engage conceptually with the new realities of Pennsylvania’s
sentencing law. Stressing the significance of the fact that Pennsylvania’s
statute “automatically mandates a punishment” for visible firearm
possession, Justice Stevens argued that “a state legislature may not dispense
with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conduct that it
targets for severe criminal penalties.”67 Justice Stevens asserted that
“[o]nce a State defines a criminal offense, the Due Process Clause requires
it to prove any component of the prohibited transaction that gives rise to
both a special stigma and a special punishment beyond a reasonable
doubt.”68
Consequently, according to Justice Stevens, because the
mandatory minimum statute “describes conduct that the Pennsylvania
Legislature obviously intended to prohibit, and because it mandates lengthy
incarceration for the same, . . . the conduct so described is an element of the
criminal offense to which the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement
applies.”69
Rendered in 1986 when many legislatures and sentencing commissions
were starting to explore and develop sentencing reforms, McMillan could

65

Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 84-91 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 566 (1967)). In addition to the
obvious impact of federalism concerns, I am inclined to speculate that the decision in
McMillan may also reflect the Supreme Court’s frustration and fatigue by the mid 1980s
with its own considerable efforts to constitutionally regulate state capital sentencing
procedures. See generally Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305
(noting that in the early 1980s the Supreme Court had diminished interest in regulating
capital punishment procedures).
67
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68
Id. Writing in a separate dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice
Blackmun expressly agreed with this statement in Justice Stevens dissent. See id. at 94
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69
Id. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66
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have had a profound impact, both conceptually and practically, on modern
sentencing laws if Justice Stevens’s views had carried the day or if the
Court’s opinion had suggested that the Constitution imposed some
significant requirements on the sentencing process. But, with the McMillan
Court stressing the importance of “tolerance for a spectrum of state
procedures” at sentencing,70 legislatures and commissions could, and
typically did, neglect procedural matters when reforming the substance of
sentencing laws.
In the wake of McMillan, as progressively more jurisdictions adopted
forms of structured sentencing through guideline systems or mandatory
sentencing statutes, two significant trends emerged. State courts and lower
federal courts, citing McMillan and Williams as controlling authority,
regularly upheld against a range of constitutional challenges various
structured sentencing systems that imposed punishment without affording
defendants at sentencing the traditional procedural protections of a criminal
trial.71
But, at the same time, individual judges and academic
commentators, citing the unfairness to defendants of being subject to factdriven guideline sentencing determinations without significant procedural
rights, regularly lamented the continued adherence to McMillan and
Williams as controlling authority.72
The Supreme Court before long was itself swept up in these trends,
primarily because the structure and operation of the federal sentencing
guidelines served to heighten the importance of sentencing fact-finding
while highlighting the absence of procedural safeguards at sentencing.
70

Id. at 90.
See, e.g., United States v. Mergerson, 995 F.2d 1285, 1291-93 (5th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); People v. Vega, 893 P.2d
107, 116 (Colo. 1995); State v. Rettinghaus, 591 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1999); Farris v. McKune,
911 P.2d 177 (Kan. 1996); People v. Eason, 458 N.W.2d 17, 21-24 (Mich. 1990); State v.
Christie, 506 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 1993); State v. Krantz, 788 P.2d 298, 303 (Mont. 1990);.
72
See, e.g., United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 389, 396 (2d Cir. 1992)
(Newman, C.J., concurring); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1519, 1527-34 (6th
Cir. 1992) (Merritt, C.J. & Martin, J., dissenting); United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414,
436 (8th Cir. 1992) (Bright, J., dissenting, joined by Arnold, C.J., Lay, & McMillian, JJ.);
Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Constitutional
Significance of the “Elements of the Sentence”, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147 (1993);
Herman, supra note 34; Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for the “Tail of the
Dog”: Finding “Elements” of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1057 (1999); Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced for a “Crime” the Government Did
Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by
Sentencing Factors Rather than Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249
(1998); Reitz, supra note 45; Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the
Guidelines Should Meet the Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 299 (1994); Note, An Argument for
Confrontation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (1992).
71
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After upholding the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act against
structural complaints in Mistretta v. United States,73 the Supreme Court
began regularly confronting claims that certain aspects of sentencing under
the federal guidelines were constitutionally problematic because of
defendants’ limited procedural rights.
Though the Supreme Court initially rebuffed most of these claims
simply by denying certiorari,74 the sheer number and significance of the
procedural issues that impacted federal guideline sentencing meant that the
Court could not avoid weighing in on these matters for long. And, in a
series of decisions, the Supreme Court consistently rejected defendants’
claims that guideline procedures were constitutionally problematic and
repudiated defendants’ arguments for expanding the procedural rights
available during sentencing under the federal guidelines.75
This line of constitutional sentencing jurisprudence reached its highwater mark, and demonstrated a telling disregard for traditional adversarial
processes, with the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in United States v.
Watts.76 In Watts, the Court constitutionally blessed the federal guidelines
provisions which require judges to enhance defendants’ sentences based on
conduct underlying charges of which they have been acquitted if the
go
v ernment establishes that conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Watts Court parroted the statement in Williams that it is essential to the
selection of an appropriate sentence for a judge to have “possession of the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and
73

488 U.S. 361 (1989).
See generally Kinder v. United States, 504 U.S. 946, 947-50 (1992) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
75
In Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992), the Court held that, absent a
“substantial threshold showing” of discriminatory behavior, a defendant has “no right to
discovery or an evidentiary hearing” to explore a prosecutor’s reasons for refusing to
recommend a reduced sentence based on the defendant’s cooperation with authorities, id. at
186-87; in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993), the Court upheld a sentence
enhancement based on a judicial finding of perjury at trial, and it stated that the fact the
“enhancement stems from a congressional mandate rather than from a court’s discretionary
judgment cannot be grounds . . . for its invalidation,” id. at 98; in Nichols v. United States,
511 U.S. 738 (1994), the Court cited both Williams and McMillan and stressed that the
“traditional understanding of the sentencing process [is] . . . less exacting than the process of
establishing guilt” to hold that a sentencing court may consider a defendant’s previous
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction when sentencing him for a subsequent offense, id. at
747; in Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995), the Court again placed heavy reliance on
Williams and McMillan and the fact that sentencing courts have traditionally considered a
wide range of information without the procedural protections of a criminal trial to hold that
there was no Double Jeopardy violation when a prior conviction increased punishment
through sentence calculations under the federal guidelines. Id. at 399-401.
76
519 U.S. 148 (1997).
74
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characteristics.” But the Court did not discuss or even acknowledge that the
Williams Court made this statement in service to the rehabilitative model of
sentencing, nor that the federal guideline at issue concerned only offense
conduct and not broad aspects of the offender’s “life and characteristics.”77
The Watts Court, again without any conceptual discussion, stressed the
“significance of the different standards of proof that govern at trial and
sentencing” and noted that “under the pre-Guidelines sentencing regime, it
was well established that a sentencing judge may take into account facts
introduced at trial relating to other charges, even ones of which the
defendant has been acquitted.”78 Thus, continuing to act as if the
sentencing revolution never happened (or at least as if the revolution had
absolutely no significance to a constitutional inquiry about required
sentencing procedures), the Watts Court held that it was permissible for the
guidelines to mandate an increase in a defendant’s punishment based on
“conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”79
Throughout the line of federal sentencing cases culminating in Watts, a
few Justices noted that the transformation of sentencing under the
guidelines raised questions about continued approval of the administrative
procedures sanctioned in the context of the rehabilitation-oriented preguidelines model of sentencing.80 But only Justice Stevens, by repeatedly
assailing the application of pre-guidelines precedents to sustain the limited
procedural rights afforded to defendants under the guidelines, engaged with
the underlying conceptual realities of the sentencing revolution that
produced the federal sentencing guidelines. In his Watts dissent, Justice
Stevens astutely noted that the “goals of rehabilitation and fairness served
by individualized sentencing that formerly justified vesting judges with
virtually unreviewable sentencing discretion have been replaced by the
impersonal interest in uniformity and retribution.”81 He complained about
the Court’s continued reliance on Williams since “its rationale depended
largely on agreement with an individualized sentencing regime that is
significantly different from the Guidelines system.”82 And Justice Stevens
closed his Watts dissent by stressing “longstanding procedural requirements
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence” and by asserting that the

77

Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 152, 155.
79
Id. at 155.
80
See, e.g., id. at 170-71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S.
738, 754-63 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81
Watts, 519 U.S. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82
Id. at 165-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78
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“notion that a charge that cannot be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt may give rise to the same punishment as if it had been so proved is
repugnant to that jurisprudence.”83
B. AN OVERDUE, BUT STILL SURPRISING, NEW WORLD ORDER

A quarter-century after Judge Frankel’s call for sentencing reform, the
sentencing revolution seemed to have achieved a measure of relative
stability, if not conceptual soundness. The sentencing reform movement
had brought an enormous amount of substantive law to a field that Judge
Frankel rightly accused of being “lawless,”84 but neither the Supreme
Court’s sentencing jurisprudence nor the work of legislatures and
sentencing commission seemed particularly concerned about updating the
procedures through which this sentencing law was administered.
Defendants in specific cases and commentators in the academic literature
often contended that the philosophical basis and discretionary structure for
lax sentencing procedures had been eliminated by modern sentencing
reforms. But the Supreme Court and other key sentencing actors and
institutions seemed content to continue to rely upon an old world procedural
model even for modern sentencing decision-making.
But then, all of a sudden, almost as if a mysterious fin-de-siecle
doctrinal light-switch was flipped, the Supreme Court’s sentencing
jurisprudence took a remarkable turn and the Court started to express
considerable concerns with traditionally lax sentencing procedures. This
new jurisprudence first surfaced with Almendarez-Torres v. United States85
and Jones v. United States,86 then shook the world of sentencing with the
“watershed” Supreme Court ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey,87 and it has
recently culminated with the “earthquake” decision in Blakely and the
federal aftershock of Booker.88
In other recent articles, I have detailed some of the conceptual ins-and83

Id. at 169-70.
See sources cited supra note 13.
85
523 U.S. 224 (1998).
86
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
87
530 U.S. 466 (2000). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing in dissent in Apprendi, is
to be credited with using the term “watershed” to describe the majority’s decision. See
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Apprendi decision
“will surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law”).
88
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and others have invoked an earthquake metaphor to
describe the impact of the Blakely decision. See Senate, Judges Urge ‘Blakely’ Redux, 231
N.Y.L.J. 2, 2 (2004) (quoting Justice O’Connor’s earthquake comments at the Ninth
Circuit’s annual conference in July); see also Douglas A. Berman, The Blakely Earthquake
and Its Aftershocks, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 307 (2004).
84
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outs of this modern sentencing jurisprudence and suggested that this new
jurisprudence can and should be viewed as the inevitable product of the
pressures created by the intersection of the Supreme Court’s own revolution
of criminal procedures and sentencing reformers’ revolution of the
substance of sentencing decision-making.89 In short form, the essence of
this story is that structured sentencing reforms—particularly because they
have tended to make sentencing determinations more offense-oriented and
fact-driven—have transformed sentencing decision-making into a more
trial-like enterprise.90 Because of this reality—combined particularly with
the fact that, because of the large percentage of cases are resolved through
guilty pleas, sentencing typically serves as the only trial-like procedure for
most defendants91—it was likely only a matter of time before the Supreme
Court imposed some form of restriction on how much of the day-to-day
dynamics of criminal justice administration could be relegated to the largely
procedure-free world of sentencing.92
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States93 and Jones v. United States,94 a
significant and consequential number of Supreme Court Justices started to
express serious concerns with judge-centered administrative sentencing
procedures. Though the Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres ultimately
concluded that evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions could be used to

89

See Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 1
(forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing]; Douglas A.
Berman, The Roots and Realities of Blakely, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2005, at 9; Berman, supra
note 32.
90
See generally Beale, supra note 72; Herman, supra note 34; Hoffmann, supra note 62,
at 267-68; Young, supra note 72.
91
See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1149-50 (2001) (stressing significance of prevalence of
guilty pleas in the criminal justice system); see also United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d
259, 264-79 (D. Mass. 2004) (detailing the centrality of plea agreements and plea bargaining
in the operation of the federal criminal justice system).
92
Professor Hoffmann made a similar observation in his article on Apprendi, in which he
states:
Th[e] evolution in both the form and substance of sentencing hearings undoubtedly influenced
the Court to see sentencing hearings as more like guilt/innocence trials than before [and] seems
to be reflected in the Court’s abrupt change of direction in Apprendi. In short, as an unintended
consequence of the recent move from discretionary to determinate sentencing, sentencing
hearings have begun to look more and more like adversarial proceedings, which in turn has
helped to ensure that they will be treated, for constitutional purposes, more and more like
adversarial proceedings. Apprendi, in other words, is a natural and perhaps even predictable
consequence of the recent trend toward adversarial-ness in sentencing.

Hoffmann, supra note 62, at 267-68.
93
523 U.S. 224 (1998).
94
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
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increase a sentence without being subject to the procedural rules for
elements of crimes at trial, the 5-4 division of the Court, as well as Justice
Scalia’s strong dissent asserting that the Court’s holding raised serious
constitutional problems, was a harbinger of decisions to come.95 The
following term, the Court in Jones suggested that Almendarez-Torres
announced a prior conviction exception to a rule that facts establishing
higher penalties must be treated procedurally as offense elements.96
Then, in 2000, the same five Justices in the Jones majority voted in
Apprendi v. New Jersey97 to convert the Jones Court’s suggestion into what
Justice O’Connor in dissent called a “watershed” ruling.98 The Apprendi
Court declared unconstitutional a New Jersey hate crime enhancement that
enabled a sentencing judge to impose a sentence higher than the otherwise
available statutory maximum for various crimes based on a finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that an offense involved racial animus. The
Apprendi Court asserted the hate crime sentencing enhancement was
constitutionally problematic because, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”99
Despite the constitutional rumblings in Almendarez-Torres and Jones,
much of the criminal justice world was taken by surprise by the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Apprendi. Given the constitutional discourse in
Almendarez-Torres and Jones, however, it was not truly astonishing that a
majority of Justices in Apprendi, perhaps impacted by cases litigated
throughout the 1990s which highlighted the consequences of reliance on
judge-centered administrative sentencing procedures after the sentencing
revolution had turned sentencing decision-making into more of a trial-like
enterprise, were troubled by provisions authorizing judges to greatly
enhance criminal sentences based on preponderance fact-finding. Still,
Apprendi was a shocking decision, in part because the Court’s holding and
dicta, especially if construed broadly, could cast constitutional doubt on
many sentencing statutes and guidelines enacted during the modern
sentencing reform movement. Most structured and guideline sentencing
95

Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in AlmendarezTorres. 523 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
96
The Jones majority, which was comprised of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas
and Ginsburg, avoided an express constitutional holding by interpreting the statute at issue in
Jones to comply with the suggested constitutional rule. See 526 U.S. at 232-39.
97
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
98
See id. at 524 (O’Connor, J, dissenting) (asserting that the Apprendi decision “will
surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law”).
99
Id. at 490.
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reforms provided a significant role for judicial fact-finding at sentencing,
and the federal guidelines built such fact-finding into the foundation of its
sentencing scheme.100 Apprendi’s holding and logic suggested that all
modern sentencing decision-making which relied on judicial fact-finding,
despite having been constitutionally blessed for decades, was now
constitutionally problematic.
And yet, though Apprendi generated much litigation and many
appellate decisions trying to interpret and give effect to its ruling,101 the
decision initially proved to have a smaller impact on modern sentencing
reforms than many expected or even hoped. Lower federal and state courts
typically interpreted Apprendi narrowly in order to preserve, as much as
possible, existing sentencing structures that relied on judicial factfinding,102 and legislatures did not feel compelled to alter existing
sentencing systems or criminal codes in light of Apprendi.103
The Supreme Court itself contributed significantly to restricting the
reach of Apprendi through its decision in United States v. Harris.104 In
Harris, the Court examined anew the issue it had previously addressed in
McMillan, namely what procedures were constitutionally required when a
statute specified a mandatory minimum sentencing term. The Supreme
Court in Harris ultimately reaffirmed McMillan and held, in a fractured
ruling, that facts which mandated minimum penalties did not require
submission to a jury or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.105 Though Harris
100

See William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 496 (1990) (describing the
“relevant conduct” provisions, which call for judicial fact-finding of offense-related conduct,
“the cornerstone of the federal sentencing guideline system”).
101
See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 62, at 256 (noting that there were more than 400
reported Apprendi decisions within a year of the decision); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Apres Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 331 (2000) (detailing some of the immediate
post-Apprendi lower court litigation).
102
See generally Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues of Federalism as
a Structural Limit on Errors, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2003).
103
The one exception to this story comes from Kansas, where the Kansas Supreme Court
held after Apprendi that its judicially administered sentencing guidelines system was
constitutionally problematic. See State v. Cullen, 60 P.3d 933 (Kan. 2003); State v. Gould,
23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001). The Kansas legislature responded by creating procedures for
using sentencing juries to find necessary facts in certain cases. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214718 (Supp. 2A 2003).
104
536 U.S. 545 (2002).
105
Id. On the same day Harris was decided, the Court also expanded Apprendi’s reach
in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), by holding that facts that establish eligibility for the
death penalty require submission to a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However,
because most jurisdictions already relied on jury sentencing in capital cases, the Court’s
decision in Harris to limit the procedural requirements for imposition of minimum sentences
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is deemed by many to be conceptually hazy in light of Apprendi,106 the
practical consequences of Harris appeared mighty clear at the time. The
holding in Harris suggested that, despite an Apprendi scare, the statutory
and guidelines sentencing provisions developed during the sentencing
revolution could largely continue to operate with judge-centered,
administrative sentencing procedures. As Professor Stephanos Bibas put
matters at the time, by holding in Harris that only facts which raise
maximum sentences, and not those which establish minimums, must be
treated procedurally as elements, the Supreme Court seemed to have “caged
the potentially ravenous, radical Apprendi tiger that threatened to devour
modern sentencing law.”107
But then came the Blakely earthquake and the Booker aftershock.
When certiorari was granted in Blakely v. Washington, most observers
believed the case was to serve as final confirmation that the Apprendi
decision would not radically transform modern sentencing practices. After
Harris, the widely-shared belief was that the sentencing revolution had
been spared from further constitutional intrusion, and it was thought that the
Supreme Court would use Blakely to rule, as had nearly all lower courts,
that Apprendi had no applicability to judicial fact-finding which only
impacted guideline sentencing outcomes within otherwise applicable
statutory ranges.
But Justice Scalia, writing for the Court and on behalf of the same
group of five Justices constituting the majority in Jones and Apprendi,
concluded that Ralph Blakely’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was
violated when a Washington State sentencing judge enhanced his guideline
sentence based on the judge’s factual finding that his kidnapping offense
involved “deliberate cruelty.”108 Linking this holding back to the Court’s
Apprendi ruling, Justice Scalia explained:
Our precedents make clear . . . that the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is
the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in

seemed at the time to be the most important and telling iteration of the scope and reach of
Apprendi.
106
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33 (2003); Kyron Huigens,
Harris, Ring, and the Future of Relevant Conduct Sentencing, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 88
(2002); see also Harris, 536 U.S. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“I cannot easily distinguish Apprendi . . . from this case in terms of logic. For
that reason, I cannot agree with the plurality’s opinion insofar as it finds such a
distinction.”).
107
Stephanos Bibas, Back from the Brink: The Supreme Court Balks at Extending
Apprendi to Upset Most Sentencing, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 79, 79 (2002).
108
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2531.
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the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant “statutory
maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional
109
facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.

Justice Scalia further explained that this particular articulation of the
meaning and reach of Apprendi “reflects not just respect for longstanding
precedent, but the need to give intelligible content to the right of a jury trial.
That right is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of
power in our constitutional structure.”110 And Justice Scalia concluded his
opinion for the Court with the breathtakingly bold assertion that “every
defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts
legally essential to the punishment.”111
The potential impact of Blakely on modern sentencing systems is truly
staggering because the decision not only redefined the reach of Apprendi,
but also suggests that any and every fact “legally essential to the
punishment” must be either proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or
admitted by the defendant. Indeed, it is hard to read the opinion without
believing that the Blakely majority had conclusively decided that the
sentencing revolution, which had come to rely on judge-centered
administrative sentencing procedures, should have to start granting
defendants the full panoply of jury-centered adversarial procedures.
Consequently, after the Supreme Court agreed to consider on an expedited
schedule Blakely’s applicability to the federal sentencing guidelines in the
cases of United States v. Booker112 and United States v. Fanfan,113 nearly all
observers were prepared for the Court to declare Blakely applicable to the
federal system and thereby find unconstitutional the federal sentencing
guidelines’ reliance on judicial fact-finding at sentencing.
And yet, the Supreme Court in Booker still found a way to surprise and
confound legal observers by devising an unexpected remedy for the federal
system. The same five Justices who comprised the majorities in Jones,
Apprendi, and Blakely did rule in Booker that the federal sentencing
guidelines, when instructing judges to make factual findings to calculate
increases in applicable sentencing ranges, transgressed the Sixth
Amendment’s jury trial right.114 But the prescribed remedy in Booker was

109

Id. at 2537.
Id. at 2538-39.
111
Id. at 2543.
112
See 125 S. Ct. 11 (2005) (granting certiorari in Booker and providing for expedited
briefing schedule).
113
See 125 S. Ct. 12 (2005) (granting certiorari in Fanfan and providing for expedited
briefing schedule).
114
See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005).
110
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not, as this ruling would seem to connote, a larger role for juries in the
operation of the federal sentencing system. Rather, as a result of a
defection by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a different group of five Justices,
the Apprendi and Blakely dissenters plus Justice Ginsburg, concluded that
the remedy for this Sixth Amendment problem was to declare the federal
sentencing guidelines wholly advisory.115
The Booker decision, remarkable for many reasons, found a way to
make a conceptually muddled constitutional jurisprudence concerning
sentencing procedures even more opaque. Through the dual rulings of
dueling majorities, the Supreme Court in Booker declared that the federal
sentencing system could no longer rely upon mandated and tightly directed
judicial fact-finding, and as a remedy it created a system which now
depends upon discretionary and loosely directed judicial fact-finding. Thus,
to culminate a jurisprudence seemingly seeking to vindicate the role of the
jury and to require a new set of sentencing procedures in modern sentencing
systems, the so-called “remedial majority” in Booker devised a new system
of federal sentencing which granted judges more sentencing power than
they had ever previously wielded and seemingly endorsed the entire
panoply of relatively lax sentencing procedures that had been used in the
federal system over the prior two decades.
C. THE LURKING DUE PROCESS ASPECTS OF THE NEW SENTENCING
JURISPRUDENCE

Though the Supreme Court’s new sentencing jurisprudence can and
will be examined and critiqued from many angles and perspectives, my
chief goal in this Foreword is to spotlight the critical procedural issues that
lurk in the jurisprudential penumbras of the discussion of the Sixth
Amendment’s jury trial right in Blakely and Booker. Blakely and Booker
have been cast by the Supreme Court, and analyzed by commentators, as
almost exclusively about jury trial rights and the decision-making authority
of judges and juries. But it is critical to recognize and appreciate that the
Supreme Court’s reoriented sentencing jurisprudence has roots in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the notice
provision of the Sixth Amendment.
In the often overlooked case of Jones v. United States—which
presaged Apprendi and set out the key principle that Apprendi announced
and Blakely developed as a new constitutional mandate—the Supreme
Court drew on constitutional provisions and principles beyond the Sixth

115
See id. at 756-71 (Breyer J., announcing opinion of the Court, with Rehnquist, C.J. &
O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
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Amendment’s jury trial right. Decided in 1999, the year before Apprendi,
Jones was the first case in which five Justices expressly suggested that facts
establishing higher penalties must be treated procedurally as offense
elements,116 and the Jones Court stated the basis and reach of its developing
constitutional rule in broad terms. In a key footnote, the Jones Court
asserted that “a set of constitutional concerns that have emerged through a
series of our decisions over the past quarter century” suggested the principle
that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.”117 Notably, in his opinion for the Court in Booker,
Justice Stevens explains and emphasizes Jones as the first case in which the
Supreme Court, responding to the “new trend in the legislative regulation of
sentencing,” started to revise its constitutional jurisprudence of required
sentencing procedures.118
Further, in building upon Jones to establish a definitive constitutional
rule in Apprendi, the Supreme Court expressly drew upon the due process
concepts which the Court in Winship had used to formalize “beyond a
reasonable doubt” as the standard of proof in criminal prosecutions. The
Apprendi Court explained that since Winship, “we have made clear beyond
peradventure that Winship’s due process and associated jury protections
extend, to some degree, ‘to determinations that [go] not to a defendant’s
guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence.’”119 And
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court in Booker starts its substantive
discussion with a quote from Winship’s due process ruling about standards
of proof, and states that these principles, “firmly rooted in the common law,
have provided the basis for recent decisions interpreting modern criminal
statutes and sentencing procedures.”120
In other words, before Blakely and Booker recast the Supreme Court’s
reoriented sentencing jurisprudence toward just the Sixth Amendment’s
jury trial right, it was clear that the “watershed” rule suggested in Jones and
established in Apprendi was about a lot more—particularly, what the Due
116

The Jones majority, which was comprised of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas
and Ginsburg, avoided an express constitutional holding by interpreting the statute at issue in
Jones to comply with the suggested constitutional rule. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 232-39 (1999).
117
Id. at 243 n.6.
118
See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 748-49, 771-52, 756 (Stevens, J., announcing opinion of the
Court).
119
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484 (2000) (citation omitted).
120
See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747-48 (Stevens, J., announcing opinion of the Court).
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Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the notice
provision of the Sixth Amendment might mean for modern sentencing
systems. The broader constitutional ambit of Jones and Apprendi was for
good reason. As highlighted in Part I of this Foreword, the rehabilitative
philosophy of punishment provided the conceptual justification in Williams
v. New York for not extending constitutionally protected trial rights to
sentencing.121 Because the medical model of sentencing which dominated
before modern reforms conceived sentencing as an enterprise designed to
help “cure” the sick defendant, the idea of significant procedural rights at
sentencing almost did not make sense: Just as patients are not thought to
need “procedural rights” when being treated by a doctor, defendants were
not thought to need procedural rights when being sentenced by a court. But
it has now been nearly a quarter century since the rehabilitative model of
sentencing has held sway, and yet until Jones and Apprendi and Blakely and
Booker came along, our sentencing structures still relied without much
question on lax procedures for proving the truth of facts that would lead to
extended sentences.
In short, because the fundamental philosophy and essential goals of
modern sentencing have been reconceived, a broad jurisprudential
rethinking of the structures and procedures for modern sentencing decisionmaking has in fact been long overdue. Though Blakely and Booker have
spotlighted the jury trial right, the due process and notice issues raised by
the Supreme Court in Jones and Apprendi should be an integral part of new
jurisprudential debates over modern sentencing procedures. Indeed, in our
real world of guilty pleas in which jury trial rights are waived in nine out of
every ten cases, the future development of the due process and notice issues
lurking around the Supreme Court’s new sentencing jurisprudence are
likely more important to the parties and likely to have a greater practical
impact than further development of the jury trial right.122
But though Jones and Apprendi expressly, and Blakely and Booker
implicitly, draw upon constitutional due process and notice principles and
provisions, none of these decisions have charted a clear course for a
reconceived constitutional jurisprudence of sentencing procedures. Indeed,
though these rulings appear tortured and opaque concerning the meaning
and application of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right, they have
actually produced an even greater conceptual and doctrinal muddle
121

See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
See Bibas, supra note 91, at 1177-78 (discussing importance to sentencing
determinations of procedural issues other than the jury trial right); Bowman, supra note 32,
at 187-91 (same); see also James E. Felman, The Need for Procedural Reform in Federal
Criminal Cases , 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. ___ (forthcoming 2005).
122
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concerning other procedural rights of defendants at sentencing.
Consequently, in this Foreword I do not—really cannot—aspire to provide
a complete account of all the issues and concerns of sentencing procedure
that deserve and demand attention in the wake of Blakely and Booker. But I
can and will in Part III briefly sketch some considerations for courts and
other key sentencing actors and institutions as they explore what process is
due in modern sentencing systems.
III. PONDERING A MODERN SENTENCING PROCESS
Looking forward to conclude this Foreword, in this final Part my goal
is to suggest that the doctrinal particulars and uncertainties of Blakely and
Booker should not eclipse the broader procedural messages and lessons to
be drawn from the Supreme Court’s new sentencing jurisprudence.
Whatever else one thinks about Blakely and Booker, these cases deserve
credit for engendering a national conversation on a range of sentencing
issues, and they should particularly encourage jurisdictions to examine and
reflect broadly upon the appropriate structure and procedures of modern
sentencing decision-making. In addition, as jurisdictions review and
respond to the rulings in Blakely and Booker, policymakers have a unique
opportunity to consider which institutions ought to take the lead in
examining and establishing the appropriate structure and procedures of
modern sentencing decision-making.
A. CRITICAL ISSUES, AND UNCERTAIN PRINCIPLES, FOR MODERN
SENTENCING PROCEDURE

Because Blakely and Booker focus particularly on the division of
decision-making authority between juries and judges, it is dangerously easy
to view these cases as only about the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right.
Indeed, because much of the post-Booker discussion of federal sentencing
law and policy has focused upon the pros and cons of judicial sentencing
discretion and the relative severity of federal sentences, it is dangerously
easy to forget that Blakely and Booker are fundamentally cases about
sentencing procedures in the first instance.
But, as suggested in the exegesis of the Supreme Court’s old and new
sentencing jurisprudence of Part II, the constitutional regulation of
sentencing procedures in general, and the recent decisions in Jones and
Apprendi and Blakely and Booker in particular, implicate other
constitutional provisions and principles. Indeed, all of the Supreme Court’s
sentencing cases and the reactions they have engendered—especially when
viewed against the backdrop of the historical development of sentencing
laws and procedures detailed in the first two Parts of this Foreword—
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highlight the inextricable link between the substance and procedures of
modern sentencing reforms. Judge Frankel’s concerns about “The Dubious
Process” at sentencing, which he expressed more than three decades ago in
Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, highlighted at the very beginning
of the modern sentencing reform era that effective procedural reforms are a
critical and necessary part of any effort to achieve the substantive goals of
sentencing reform.123 And, throughout three decades of modern sentencing
reforms, numerous judges and academic commentators have lamented the
insufficient attention given to fundamental procedural issues—such as
notice to parties, burdens of proof, appropriate fact-finders, evidentiary
rules and hearing processes—that play a central role in the actual
application of general sentencing rules to specific cases.124 Moreover, in
the wake of Blakely and Booker, an array of sentencing participants are
starting to explore more fully the importance of effective and appropriate
sentencing procedures to the broader goals of sentencing reform.125
Though Blakely and Booker have now ensured that the jury trial right
of the Sixth Amendment receives attention and consideration, that right
only concerns who makes certain determinations, not how these
determinations are made. But, as stressed in the final section of Part II, the
“watershed” rule suggested in Jones and established in Apprendi also
concerns the procedural matters such as notice to parties and burdens of
proof. Though Blakely and Booker spelled out what the Jones/Apprendi
rule means for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right in
modern sentencing schemes, additional decisions will be needed for a full
articulation of what the Jones/Apprendi rule means for notice and proof
issues in modern sentencing schemes.
Moreover, sentencing decision-making encompasses or implicates
many more procedural issues and many more constitutional provisions than
123

See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
See sources cited supra note 72; see also Gertner, supra note 7, at 83-85; STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 5, at 148-158; Bibas, supra note 91, at 1177-78. See generally
Richard Smith-Monahan, Unfinished Business: The Changes Necessary to Make Guidelines
Sentencing Fair, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 219 (2000).
125
See, e.g., Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray, Testimony to the House
Subcommittee of Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security: Oversight Hearing on “The
Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines” at 11
(Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Wray021005.pdf
(stressing that “to have consistent sentences, it is essential that sentencing hearings have
consistent form and substance”); Felman, supra note 122; see also United States v. Kelley,
355 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1034-39 (D. Neb. 2005) (discussing role and importance of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt even within an advisory guideline system); United States v. Gray,
2005 WL 613645, at **4-8 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 17, 2005) (same); United States v. Pimental,
2005 WL _____, at __ (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2005).
124
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most courts and commentators realize. Indeed, in a recent article, Professor
Alan Michaels has identified twenty-five significant procedural rights that
defendants have at a criminal trial—“from employing an attorney to not
having inferences drawn from one’s silence, from bail and Brady to
presence and proceeding pro se”—which could plausibly be extended to
sentencing.126 Interestingly, in his comprehensive (pre-Blakely) taxonomy
of sentencing rights, Professor Michaels has determined that the Supreme
Court “has found roughly one quarter [of these twenty-five trial rights]
apply at sentencing and one quarter do not” and that the rights “in the
remaining half, still undecided at the Supreme Court level, have been
resolved with similar percentages by lower courts—some apply, some do
not, and about half remain unresolved.”127 Though the doctrinal particulars
and broader significance of each of these rights is beyond the scope of this
Foreword, Professor Michaels’ analysis spotlights how much
jurisprudential work lies ahead as the Supreme Court and lower courts
continue to confront procedural issues that necessarily arise due to the ever
more trial-like realities of modern sentencing decision-making within
structured and guideline sentencing systems.128
But the key challenge for courts—and, as explained below, for other
sentencing institutions and policy-makers—is not the sheer number of
procedural issues, but rather the principles which should be brought to bear
in deciding whether and how constitutional trial rights ought to be
recognized and safeguarded at sentencing. Though lacking a fundamental
legal structure and often leading to disparate outcomes, the rehabilitative
model of sentencing at least had the virtue of providing an underlying
theory for determining whether and how trial rights ought to be recognized
at sentencing. In service to the rehabilitative ideal, sentencing judges and
parole officials, purportedly endowed with unique insights and expertise in
deciding what sorts and lengths of punishments were necessary to best
serve each criminal offender’s rehabilitative potential, needed complete
information about offenses and offenders in order to craft effective
rehabilitative sentences. As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v.
New York129 and in other constitutional rulings of the period,130 the
126

See Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1775 (2003).
Id.
128
See generally supra text accompanying notes 83-91 (discussing the Apprendi lines of
cases as the by-product of structured sentencing reforms having transformed sentencing
decision-making into a more trial-like enterprise).
129
See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-48 (1949); see also supra text
accompanying notes 44-51.
130
See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979); United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-54 (1978).
127
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rehabilitative ideal called for sentencing judges and parole officials to be
freed from any procedural rules which might work to limit the sound
exercise of their discretion. The historical commitment to the rehabilitative
ideal and the Supreme Court’s long-standing adherence to Williams (even
as the rehabilitative ideal was largely rejected by modern sentencing
reforms131) perhaps accounts for how Professor Michaels was able to find
“a consistent principle” in his (pre-Blakely) examination of the Supreme
Court’s sentencing jurisprudence. According to Professor Michaels, the
Supreme Court’s approach to sentencing procedures has historically sought
to vindicate what he calls “the best-estimate principle” by facilitating
judicial efforts to craft a “proper” sentence:
The Court’s decisions are consistent with a conception of sentencing as
constitutionally mandating a balanced and thorough effort to determine the “right”
sentence, within the range of prescribed penalties. In making that determination,
however, there is no mandated presumption of “sentencing innocence”—in other
words, no requirement that the defendant be given the benefit of the doubt. Within
the range of allowable sentences, “too low” is not intrinsically better than “too high.”
The mandate is to make a best estimate of the “right” sentence, but without the builtin presumption towards resolving errors in the defendant’s favor that is present at the
132
trial level.

Given that the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence historically
was influenced and shaped by the rehabilitative ideal and its commitment to
“curing” offenders—which, explained the Williams Court, meant many
offenders “could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete
freedom and useful citizenship”133—it likely once was in everyone’s
interest to keep procedural rights from getting in the way of determining the
“best” sentence. Because the rehabilitative ideal necessarily incorporated
pro-defendant values, it made sense for this Supreme Court’s sentencing
jurisprudence to foster “a balanced and thorough process [by recognizing]
rights that support accuracy concerns or that tend to put the prosecution and
defense on a more even playing field,” but to not recognize rights “that
offer the defendant special protections such as those that automatically
resolve errors in the defendant’s favor or primarily protect the defendant’s
autonomy.”134
But, as suggested earlier, an express or implicit component of most
statutory and guideline sentencing reforms has been a rejection of the
rehabilitative ideal.135 The sentencing revolution has ushered in punitive
131
132
133
134
135

See supra text accompanying notes 9-31, 58-61.
See Michaels, supra note 126, at 1775-76.
Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
See Michaels, supra note 126, at 1862.
Recall the Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act at issue in McMillan
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sentencing provisions as jurisdictions have directly or indirectly repudiated
or reformed many tenets of the old rehabilitative sentencing concept. But
the sentencing revolution has rejected the old conceptual and procedural
sentencing model without providing a clear and philosophically cogent new
conceptual or procedural model to take its place.136
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s dual rulings in Booker can be
viewed and understood as reflecting two divergent conceptual and
procedural models competing for a new dominance in the wake of the
demise of the rehabilitative ideal. The (partial) opinion of Justice Stevens
for the Court in Booker discusses the impact of modern sentencing reforms
on the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence in a way that champions
providing defendants with special procedural protections at sentencing.137
Discussing the “new trend in the legislative regulation of sentencing,”
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court in Booker highlights that the “effect
of the increasing emphasis on facts that enhanced sentencing ranges . . . was
to increase the judge’s power and diminish that of the jury.”138
Consequently, explains Justice Stevens, the new sentencing laws required,
for the sake of “preserving an ancient guarantee under a new set of
circumstances,”139 a new constitutional jurisprudence:
The new sentencing practice forced the Court to address the question how the right of
jury trial could be preserved, in a meaningful way guaranteeing that the jury would
still stand between the individual and the power of the government under the new
sentencing regime. And it is the new circumstances, not a tradition or practice that the
new circumstances have superseded, that have led us to the answer first considered in
Jones and developed in Apprendi and subsequent cases culminating with this one. It is
an answer not motivated by Sixth Amendment formalism but by the need to preserve
140
Sixth Amendment substance.

This passage reveals that Justice Stevens is seeking to lead a faction of the

which sought, in the words of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, “to protect the public
from armed criminals and to deter violent crime and the illegal use of firearms generally, as
well as to vindicate its interest in punishing those who commit serious crimes with guns.”
Commonwealth v. Wright, 494 A.2d 354, 362 (Pa. 1985).
136
I explore more fully the conceptual vacuum created by the decline of the
rehabilitative ideal and suggest ways to fill this vacuum in another recent article. See
Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, supra note 89.
137
Of course, as evidenced by his dissents in McMillan and Watts, see supra text
accompanying notes 67-69, 80-82, Justice Stevens has been advocating a revised approach to
the constitutional regulation of sentencing procedures since the outset of the modern
sentencing reform era.
138
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 751 (Stevens, J., announcing opinion of the Court, with Scalia,
Souter, Thomas, & Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
139
Id. at 752.
140
Id.
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Supreme Court toward a new jurisprudence that will provide greater
procedural protections to individual defendants in the application of modern
statutory and guidelines sentencing systems.
But, of course, Justice Stevens’s (partial) opinion for the Court in
Booker is only half the story since, as a result of a defection by Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Breyer’s (partial) opinion for the Court established the
remedy in Booker. The remedy crafted for the Court by Justice Breyer,
which evades Sixth Amendment problems by making the federal sentencing
guidelines advisory instead of mandatory, essentially endorses the relatively
lax sentencing procedures that have been used in the federal system over the
prior two decades. Justice Breyer makes clear throughout his opinion that
he does not share Justice Stevens’s concern with providing individual
defendants with special protections at sentencing. Rather, Justice Breyer
represents a faction of the Supreme Court embracing whatever sentencing
procedures are needed to foster the modern sentencing reform goal of
achieving greater sentencing uniformity.141 Justice Breyer’s opinion for the
Court in Booker assails the proposed remedy of “engrafting” jury trial rights
onto the federal sentencing system because doing so would undermine the
goals of sentencing uniformity.142 In other words, Justice Breyer thinks
sentencing procedures should still serve, in Professor Michaels’s
terminology, the “the best-estimate principle,”143 although now the goal is
to achieve more uniform sentences rather than rehabilitative sentences.
In short, the pitched battle over the rights and results in Blakely and
Booker reflect competing visions of what procedural concepts and norms
will take center-stage as the Supreme Court considers the applicable
constitutional rules for modern sentencing decision-making. Justice
Stevens leads a faction of the Court concerned about safeguarding
procedural rights for defendants at sentencing, while Justice Breyer leads a
faction of the Court concerned about ensuring that applicable procedures at
sentencing serve the goal of sentencing uniformity. But, with Justice
Ginsburg having allied herself with both of these competing factions in
Booker, the schizophrenic Booker ruling further obscures which principles
should guide lower courts in considering the broad range of procedural
issues beyond jury trial rights that follow in the wake of Booker. Yet the
141
See id. at 756-71 (Breyer, J., announcing opinion of the Court with Rehnquist, C.J., &
O’Connor, Kennedy, & Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
142
See id. at 761 (arguing the “real conduct/uniformity-in-sentencing relationship” would
not be served by having juries involved in sentencing guideline determinations); id. at 76263 (contending that, due to the impact of plea bargaining, application of jury trial rights in
the federal guidelines system would undermine efforts to achieve greater sentencing
uniformity).
143
See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
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fate and future of sentencing procedures—particularly concerning critical
issues such as notice to parties and burdens of proofs—may depend greatly
on the outcome of this conceptual battle. Consider, as but one possible
example, the issue of burden of proof: A heightened concern for
defendants’ procedural rights at sentencing suggests a heightened burden of
proof for facts which lead to longer sentences, but a concern for sentencing
uniformity might support continued application of the preponderance
standard of proof.
B. A ROLE FOR OTHER INSTITUTIONS

Seeking to find a silver lining in the conceptual dark cloud that is the
Booker decision, we might laud the case for at least helping to define the
terms of debate as courts ponder a new process for modern sentencing.
Moreover, the agonizing jurisprudential struggles reflected in Apprendi,
Harris, Blakely and Booker reveal that courts may not always be the ideal
institution for the development of modern sentencing procedures and that
other institutions need to play an integral role in the consideration of the
critical procedural issues that surround modern sentencing reforms.
Indeed, the modern history of sentencing reforms set out in this
Foreword suggests there are harmonic cycles in the way legislatures and
courts develop sentencing laws and procedures. For more than fifty years
there has been an on-going inter-branch dialogue about sentencing laws and
practices,144 although the discussion of sentencing procedures has been
woefully underdeveloped and problematically stagnant. Indeed, the recent
tortured development of the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence may
in part reflect the failure of other institutions to help work through the
procedural issues raised by the modern sentencing revolution. Moreover,
looking beyond the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential struggles, it should be
clear that the conceptual reconsideration of sentencing law and procedure in
light of the sentencing revolution is not a job just for courts; the legal
developments and principles spotlighted by Jones and Apprendi and Blakely
and Booker should be understood by legislatures and sentencing
commissions as an invitation to reexamine a broad range of issues of
sentencing procedure and practice.145 The work of legislatures, sentencing
commissions, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers and parole
boards can and should be informed by attentiveness to all the substantive
and procedural provisions and principles spotlighted by Jones and Apprendi
144

Cf. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2550-51 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(discussing the inter-branch dialogue concerning modern sentencing reforms).
145
See generally Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, supra note 89 (suggesting
some principles for the broad conceptual reconsideration of sentencing law and policy).
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and Blakely and Booker.
Reflecting broadly on the sentencing reform era, we should seize this
moment in the evolution of modern sentencing reforms to return to the
fundamental concepts and sound suggestions of Judge Marvin Frankel and
particularly to recall his advocacy of expert sentencing commissions as a
central player in reforming sentencing law and procedures. The sentencing
commission as an institution grew out of the realization that neither the
judiciary nor legislatures had been able to, nor could really be expected to,
develop and monitor effective and comprehensive sentencing reforms.146
Sentencing commissions were envisoned, and have been designed, to have
the resources and expertise to engineer systemic sentencing reforms.147
Moreover, as an administrative body able not only to study the workings of
the criminal justice system as a whole, but also to implement, monitor and
adjust multi-faceted system-wide reforms, sentencing commissions are
uniquely positioned to assess the complex procedural issues thatimpact the
workings of the criminal justice system.148
Of course, because of the general neglect of procedural matters in prior
reform efforts, sentencing commission have a lot of work to do: critical
procedural issues like notice to parties, appropriate fact-finders, burdens of
proof, applicable evidentiary rules, and sound hearing procedures are all in
need of careful and extended study and call for thoughtful reforms,
particularly since the move toward structured sentencing systems have
tended to transform sentencing decision-making into a more trial-like
enterprise. But it is not foolhardy to find optimism in the possible efforts of
sentencing commissions given the generally positive track-record of these

146

See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The
Need and Opportunity for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 95-96 (1999);
see also Michael H. Tonry, The Sentencing Commission in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 315 (1978) (discussing various justifications for, and benefits of, the creation of a
sentencing commission); von Hirsch, supra note 5 (same).
147
See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715 (2005)
(examining the history behind, and efficacies of, the development of sentencing
commissions); Michael Tonry, The Success of Judge Frankel’s Sentencing Commission, 64
U. COLO. L. REV. 713, 714-16 (1993) (same); cf. Berman, supra note 143, at 108-10 (noting
some of the institutional struggles of the U.S. Sentencing Commission).
148
See Barry L. Johnson, The Role of the United States Sentencing Commission in the
Reform of Sentencing Procedures, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 229, 230-31 (2000)
(highlighting features of the U.S. Sentencing Commission that make it an appropriate body
for procedural reforms in the federal sentencing system); cf. Ronald F. Wright, Rules for
Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1380-87 (1999) (stressing the importance of a
coordinated approach to sentencing and highlighting the inability of judges to effectively
coordinate sentencing reforms).
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institutions in the development of substantive sentencing reforms.149
Though, as stressed in Part I, the efforts of sentencing commissions have
heretofore been directed primarily at substantive sentencing law, there is
reason to hope that Jones and Apprendi, and now Blakely and Booker, will
prompt commissions to carry forward their reform efforts to address the
specifics of sentencing procedures. Moreover, there is a basis for believing
that sentencing commissions are well-designed and well-positioned to
explore and reach compromises concerning competing conceptual visions
of modern sentencing procedures. There may prove to be considerable
common ground shared by the seemingly divergent visions of modern
sentencing procedures reflected in the opinions of Justice Stevens and
Justice Breyer in Booker, and sentencing commissions developing new
sentencing procedures proactively may be better able to find that common
ground than can courts responding reactively to specific procedural claims
being pressed in particular cases by individual defendants.
IV. CONCLUSION
Blakely and Booker do not, and even future constitutional rulings may
not, directly force legislatures, sentencing commissions, lower courts and
other sentencing actors and institutions to revisit and revise all (or even
many) of the procedures that attend existing sentencing schemes. In other
words, these decisions do not directly mandate that all those in the
sentencing field move beyond Blakely and Booker to ponder modern
sentencing process. The hope for more effective sentencing reforms may
thus turn on whether the Blakely and Booker decisions have positive
reverberations for the work of sentencing lawmakers, and in particular
sentencing commissions, even beyond their constitutional impact. Even
without any further Supreme Court guidance, legislatures, sentencing
commissions, lower courts and other sentencing actors and institutions
should appreciate and respond to the simple, fundamental policy message
that Jones, Apprendi, Blakely and Booker all radiate: Procedures really
149

Calling commission-centered sentencing reform in the states a success would not
engender much debate. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 144, at 771-98 (discussing the success
of sentencing commissions and sentencing guidelines in the states); Tonry, supra note 144,
at 713-16 (same). Though federal sentencing reforms driven by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission have been subject to more criticism than praise, see, e.g., Douglas A. Berman,
Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence That Undermines the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 42-43 (2000) (detailing widespread
criticisms of the federal sentencing system), even the U.S. Sentencing Commission can be
expected to serve as an effective catalyst for future federal reform if it can learn from its past
challenges. See Barkow, supra note 144, at 798-812 (suggesting means for sentencing
commissions to be more effective).
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matter at sentencing.
Read together, the Court’s work in those four cases, though divisive
and conceptually underdeveloped, provides a wonderful primer on the
significance and the centrality of procedural issues in the actual operation of
a sentencing system. And the burgeoning academic commentary in the
wake of these decisions only reinforces and amplifies this critical message.
The Jones and Apprendi and Blakely and Booker decisions, as well as the
renewed debate over sentencing policies, practices and procedures that they
have helped engender, can and should effectively inform a long-overdue
policy dialogue among legislatures, sentencing commissions and courts
concerning procedural matters that have heretofore been incompletely
contemplated in the modern sentencing reform movement. All of these
decisions will truly mark a “watershed” development if they not only bring
needed light to critical procedural issues raised in modern sentencing
schemes, but also manage to prod sound procedural reforms that go beyond
whatever constitutional minimums are ultimately established by the
Supreme Court.
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